Fama and French (2001) document a startling and secular decline in both the proportion of firms paying dividends and the residual propensity to pay dividends over the preceding two decades. We offer a simple explanation for this phenomenon based on two concurrent trends. First, we show that over this period the average information content of stock prices has increased, diminishing the relative usefulness of dividendbased signaling -we call this the supply side effect, and show that it is able to explain approximately 30% of the residual propensity to pay dividends over this time period. Second, we find that when firms are included in the S&P500 Index, their stock price response to dividend changes and initiations, dividend yields, and the propensity to pay dividends, decline significantly. Under the assumption that indexers are less concerned with idiosyncratic information, inclusion in the index suppresses their demand for dividend-based signaling -we call this the demand side effect. Our study provides a rational explanation for the "disappearing" dividend puzzle.
Introduction
Dividends represent a puzzle whether they disappear or stay. Fama and French (2001, henceforth FF) document a large and secular decline in both the fraction of firms that pay dividends, and in the propensity to pay dividends by all firms, over the last two decades. 1 In this paper, we point to two concurrent trends in an effort to explain the declining popularity of dividends. The first is an overall increase in the information content of stock prices over this period, reducing the relative efficacy of signaling firmspecific information via dividends. The second trend is the tremendous growth in indexing coinciding with this time period -to the extent indexers care less about idiosyncratic information, we posit that the demand for such information, including the demand for dividend-based signaling, would decline.
We measure stock price informativeness (SPI) by estimating market model residuals as a proxy for idiosyncratic information, as in Roll (1988) and Morck, Yeung and Yu (2001) , and relate changes in the propensity to pay dividends to changes in SPI under the premise that the relative efficacy of dividend-based signaling diminishes when the external information environment improves. Firms respond by curbing dividends as a costly and non-conservative means of signaling.
Our proxy for indexing effects is membership in the S&P500 index. We examine what happens to dividend yields when firms are included in the S&P500 Index. We also examine the differential response of stock prices to dividend changes when firms are in the index vs. when they are not.
We are not the first to suggest that dividends have lost their dominant role in signaling. Amihud and Li (2006) argue that dividends are disappearing because their signaling role is diminished today. They base their argument on the declining dividend response coefficients (DRCs) in the face of increasing institutional holdings, on the premise that institutional shareholders have the scale to conduct private research, and hence have little use for the arguably blunter signals provided by slow-adjusting dividends. In equilibrium, dividend response coefficients decline as more private research gets impounded into prices prior to dividend announcements. Firms oblige by cutting back on dividends.
We take a slightly different tack and focus instead on dividend demand from investors when firms are added to the S&P500 Index. An advantage of our setting is that firms do not choose to be added to this index and hence the dividend change associated with this event is a response to an exogenous event. By contrast, the Amihud and Li (2006) setting may be associated with slow-moving changes in institutional ownership, making it difficult to disentangle whether institutions gravitate to low dividend paying stocks, or firms with high institutional ownership choose to reduce dividends.
Indexers have reduced incentive to invest in idiosyncratic research since they are evaluated primarily on tracking error. Regardless of earnings surprises, indexers pursue a mechanical investment strategy whose primary, often sole, purpose is to mimic the index at hand. We exploit this to control for the demand side of idiosyncratic information. Our main thesis goes through as long as firm-specific information demand declines following the addition of a firm to a widely followed index.
We find that both dividend response coefficients as well as yields decline significantly following index additions. Furthermore, we find that the coefficients are declining with calendar year as in Amihud and Li (2006) , but only for indexed stocks.
For non-index stocks, there is no systematic pattern of dividend response coefficients or yields over time. These results are novel in that they tie dividends to their demand, though not in the catering sense as in Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) . Rather, firms respond to a reduced demand for information signaling by cutting yields in the face of shifting investor preferences. To the extent indexing has grown almost monotonically over the last two decades, our results point to a hitherto overlooked facet of their demand.
We begin our analysis by documenting that dividends in general are losing their importance as a signaling device as indicated by the declining abnormal announcement returns associated with dividend initiations. This is an extension of Amihud and Li (2006) who showed that dividend increases and decreases are also accompanied by declining abnormal returns. We attribute this decline to rising SPI as proxied for by the R-square (R 2 ) measure of Roll (1988) and Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) . Our results show that firms with lower firm-level R 2 s (higher SPI) are less likely to pay dividends, and that the aggregate annual R 2 explains the time series variation in the propensity to pay dividends.
This finding implies that changes in firms' information environment have a significant impact on the information content of dividend change announcements. For instance, we find that firms that initiate dividends in periods when aggregate stock prices are less informative earn higher abnormal returns.
By using a somewhat different set of controls and methodology, we also obtain results that are consistent with the risk-based explanation of Hoberg and Prabhala (2009, henceforth H-P) . H-P add risk to a logit model for dividend payers, and find that B-W's catering hypothesis is no longer significant in explaining the time series variation in the propensity to pay dividends. As in H-P, we find that the premium for dividend payers vs. non-payers becomes insignificant after controlling for risk. However, SPI variables remain both economically and statistically significant in explaining the declining propensity to pay dividends.
Our main tests rely on changes in dividends associated with the S&P index membership. We first document reduced dividend response coefficients in periods when a firm is part of the S&P index, and repeat the finding for dividend yields. These results are consistent with Amihud and Li (2006) who show a similar relation between institutional ownership and dividends. Our results go further on two counts. First, we show a plausible channel via which institutional indifference to dividends might workindexing as an investment strategy makes fewer demands on firm level information. Second, our index membership result persists after controlling for institutional ownership, indicating that it is indexing rather than any comparative advantage in gathering information by institutions that is driving the reduced demand for dividends.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature.
Section 3 describes our data and choice of variables. Section 4 discusses the results and offers some robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
The literature starts with M&M (1961) establishing the irrelevance of dividend policy in perfect markets. Relaxing the perfect market assumptions generates important roles for dividends such as controlling agency costs or information signaling. In the latter camp are seminal articles by Ross (1977) , Bhattacharya (1979), and Miller and Rock (1985) , advocating equilibriums where dividend changes signal information about firm value, typically via information about a firm's future earnings. 2 In effect, dividends signal the quality of earnings to shareholders (Nissim and Ziv, 2001) . 3 The agency theory of dividend policy suggests that dividends also serve as a mechanism for reducing agency costs (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Easterbrook, 1984) . Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers of firms can allocate resources to activities that enhance their private benefits. Thus, dividend payouts may increase firm value by reducing over-investment. 4 In particular, the agency theory posits that distributing resources in the form of dividends forces firms to return to capital markets to raise additional funds for their investment needs, thereby subjecting firms to frequent monitoring by outside stakeholders. In summary, dividends serve the dual purpose of reducing agency costs of free cash flows and revealing inside information to outsiders.
2 See Asquith and Mullins (1983) and Healy and Palepu (1988) . 3 Arguments regarding whether dividend increases (decreases) indeed signal future profit increases (decreases) remain part of a heated debate. See, among several others, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) , Allen and Michaely (2003) , and Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler (2005) . 4 See Lang and Litzenberger (1989) for some empirical evidence.
The secular decline in dividends between 1978 and 1999 was brought to light by an influential article by Fama and French (2001) , who document a large decline in the proportion of payers between 1978 and 1999, as well as in the propensity to pay based on a logit model of dividend payers. Grullon and Michaely (2002) argue that, at the aggregate level, firms have become more likely to substitute dividends with share repurchases, and hence it makes more sense to examine payouts rather than dividends alone. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) show that the aggregate level of real dividends paid by dividend-paying firms has not declined over the period during which firm-level dividends have disappeared. They document that real dividend payments increased among the highest payers and that the observed decline in number is due to omissions by the increase in listings of smaller firms that usually pay meager amount of dividends. Baker and Wurgler (2004a) and Baker and Wurgler (2004b) propose a 'catering' theory where firms cater to investor demands or sentiments when deciding whether to initiate dividends. A prediction of the catering hypothesis is that the propensity to pay dividends increases when dividend premium is high -this is supported by B-W. Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) show that idiosyncratic risk explains a significant fraction of the disappearing dividend puzzle. When risk is added to the dividend payer model, H-P find that the propensity to pay is no longer related to dividend premium, inconsistent with the catering hypothesis. 5 The literature has not examined the precise channels through which the propensity to pay has diminished over time. 5 The terms idiosyncratic risk and firm-specific risk are used interchangeably in this paper.
Data

Variables from Prior Studies
We closely follow the variable construction proecdures as described in Fama and French (2001) , Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) , and Hoberg Prablaha (2009) and exclude utilities and financial firms. We also exclude firms with book equity below $250,000 or assets below $500,000.
A firm is defined as a payer if it has positive dividends per share on the day before the ex-dividend date. As in FF, we define the propensity to pay (PTP) as the difference between the actual percentage of firms paying dividends in a given year and the expected percentage, which is the average predicted probability from the given logit model. M/B is the market-to-book ratio, defined as book assets minus book equity plus market equity scaled by book assets. M/B is included in all regressions. The dividend premium (Premium) is defined as the lagged value of the difference between average M/B of dividend payers and nonpayers (in log-form, consistent with the definition in BW). NYP is the NYSE size percentile, defined as the percent of firms that have the same or smaller market capitalization (based on market equity value; stock price times shares outstanding) than firm i in a given year. dAssets is the change in assets scaled by total assets, and E/A is earnings (income before extraordinary items plus interest expense plus income statement deferred taxes) scaled by total assets.
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) include proxies for idiosyncratic and systematic risks to show that catering loses its appeal once these risk measures are controlled for. A firm's idiosyncratic risk in a given year is the standard deviation of residuals from the market model regression using daily returns for that calendar year. We impose the 200 minimum trading day requirements for calculation of idiosyncratic risk. To be consistent with Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), firm volatilities are not averaged across all firms in a given year since the main interest lies in examining idiosyncratic risk at the firm level.
Measures of the Information content of Stock Price
Our primary proxy for SPI is the R 2 measure of Roll (1988). Following Morck et al. (2000), R 2 measure is being increasingly used as a measure of SPI. Morck et al. (2000) provide evidence of higher R 2 s in poor economies than in rich economies and argue that stronger public investor property rights in rich economies promote informed arbitrage, which allows the incorporation of firm-specific information into asset prices. Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) show that firms with lower R 2 s exhibit a higher association between current returns and future earning: i.e., lower R 2 indicates greater stock price informativeness. During periods when more firm-specific news is released, one would expect the idiosyncratic component of returns to be high. We estimate market model R 2 s using monthly and weekly data. For monthly measures, we remove firms that do not have twelve months of data in a given year. Final results are qualitatively similar whether monthly or weekly data are used.
We use the following to calculate aggregate R-squares for a calendar year.
Here, R 2 t is the weighted-average R 2 s of all firms i in a given year τ. The weights are the total return variations (SST).
Our second measure of SPI is the average yearly abnormal announcement returns, CAARs, associated with dividend initiations. If dividends were to signal private (inside) information, the abnormal announcement returns associated with dividend initiations convey the magnitude of this inside information. High abnormal announcement returns imply that the initiation conveys incrementally important news to the market, ceteris paribus. We therefore argue that the magnitude of abnormal dividend announcement return is a useful proxy for SPI.
Unlike the first measure which uses a panel of firm-level R 2 s from the universe of all CRSP firms, CAARs only provides us with a general level of SPI inferred from market reactions for a much smaller sample of initiating firms. While the firm-level R 2 s can be observed for both initiating and non-initiating firms, CAARs cannot be observed for noninitiating firms. Baker and Wurgler (2004a) also use a similar announcement date measure, though they do not plot this over time and use the measure primarily as a sentiment proxy.
We define dividend initiation as the first appearance on Compustat of an ordinary cash dividend of non-monthly frequency (as in Bulan, Subramanyam and Tanlu, 2006) .
The event period for CAARs is defined as days -1 to +l, where day 0 is the dividend announcement date from CRSP. We impose a 200 minimum trading day requirements as in Michaley, Thaler and Womack (1995) and use months -14 through month -2 to estimate the parameters for excess return calculations. We do this for the period 1964-
2006.
Rising SPI and the Declining Information Content of Dividend Initiations
In Figure 1 , we use the monthly stock returns data to illustrate the annual equal-and The difference is statistically significant (p-value<0.001). Going from quintile 1 to quintile 5 we see a monotonic increase in the CAAR associated with dividend initiations.
This pattern is consistent with the notion that the information content of dividend initiations is weaker when the external information environment is stronger, and lends support to our hypothesis that the demand for dividend-based signaling is lower when the external information environment is strong.
SPI and Dividend Changes
We have seen in the previous section that the abnormal returns associated with dividend initiation announcements are higher during periods where stock prices are less informative. We now extend this analysis to dividend change announcements. The same reasoning applies here: we expect to see a more pronounced stock price reaction to dividend change announcements during periods of low SPI, and vice versa. However, since dividend changes might not convey much of 'surprise' news as initiations do, one would expect the reaction to dividend changes to be more muted. These results reinforce the idea that the information content of dividend changes is a function how informative stock prices are in general. In periods when stock prices are least informative, dividend change announcements are received as strong "news".
When SPI is high, our results suggest that dividend convey less information. Since SPI levels have trended up over the last two decades, firms have discovered that dividends may be less efficacious in conveying firm specific news to the market.
S&P500 Index Membership and Dividends
In this section, we examine the abnormal returns associated with dividend change announcements for firms that are included in the S&P500 Index. Our main premise for this exercise is that indexers are primarily focused on minimizing tracking error for their portfolios, and are less concerned about idiosyncratic information. Since firms do not choose either to be added or to be deleted from the index, and since the S&P corporation has no set views on dividend policy as a condition for Index membership, this event provides a direct means and an exogenous setting to study the effects of changes in the demand for dividend-signaling on a firm's dividend policy.
We obtain the data for S&P firms from CRSP, which provides the dates firms are added to (and deleted from) the index. We limit our analysis to dividend increases. First, dividend initiations are generally not applicable to our sample: most firms that are added to the index are dividend-payers. Second, dividend decreases are rare for S&P Index firms, so we cannot get a good estimate of the dividend decrease announcement returns for S&P Index firms.
In Table 4 , we separate firms into S&P and non-S&P groups. The first three models (I-III) report results for the group of firms that have been an index component at some point. Thus, this group consists of firms that are currently in the index, were in the index, or have always been in the index. This way, we can observe the same set of firms as they are added and deleted from the index. For dividend yield, we average the annual dividend yields of firms based on whether they are in the index for that particular year or not. For CAAR calculation, a firm is considered to be index if the dividend announcement date falls within the period when a firm is in the S&P index.
Our findings indicate that during periods when firms are in the S&P index, dividend yields decline and CAARs associated with dividend changes are smaller in magnitude. The difference between S&P and non-S&P period is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similar results are obtained when we expand the sample to include all firms. We test for the S&P index membership effect more formally using the following pooled regression:
where CAR is the firm-level dividend change abnormal announcement returns (for τ =-1 to τ =1, using the Fama and French three-factor model). As before, we initially limit our sample to firms that have been an index component at some point in time, and then test the same using all firms. Table 5 reports the results for all firms (results for the restricted are materially similar). We include both firm and time subscripts to note that the same firm could change its dividends more than once at different points in time. We do not scale dividend change by price as price may contain information that is correlated with our dependent variable, but subsequently include price for robustness. SP_DUMMY is an indicator variable that equals one if the dividend announcement date falls within the period when a firm is in the S&P index, and is zero otherwise. We scale dividend changes by earnings volatility (∆DIV/EPS.VOL) instead of beginning dividend as an additional test.
We find that SP_DUMMY is significantly negative in all model specifications, indicating that announcement returns are indeed lower in periods when firms are in the index.
Of particular interest to us is the time series dividend response coefficient (DRC)
of ∆DIV/P estimated from the regression model in Table 5 . We calculate the average DRC cross-sectionally for each year. Plotting DRC in calendar time does not show any clear trends (these results are available from the authors upon request). We further estimate
Institution is defined as the equal-weighted average institutional holdings in each year τ.
There are 27 time series observations (1980 to 2006). The coefficient of Institution is negative but insignificant (-5.17 with a t-stat of -0.55). Therefore, controlling for change in a firm's information environment in the first-stage regression not only takes away the trend in DRC but also makes institutional holdings insignificant. This is not to say that institutional holdings does not matter. However, use of institutional holding as proxy of information is questionable -perhaps institutions are motivated by other factors.
We also interact the change in dividends with S&P Index dummy, and find that the DRC is indeed smaller when firms are part of the index.
What we have shown thus far is that changes in firms' informational environments and stock price informativeness affect announcement returns for both dividend initiations and dividend changes. During periods of high SPI, announcement returns for initiations and dividend changes are lower. Also, as firms move into environments where demand for signaling is lower, dividend change announcement returns also decline in magnitude. For the rest of the paper, we mainly focus on dividend payments and initiations as the disappearing dividend phenomenon originated from dividend payments and not from changes.
Additional analysis of the propensity to pay dividends
Original F-F Variables & Idiosyncratic Risk
We first replicate Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) To sum, we find that the average change and level of PTP responds inversely to an improvement in the information environment. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that firms cut back on dividends when their relative efficacy declines -that is, an overall improvement in firm level information is associated with a reduced use of dividends for signaling the same information.
Robustness checks
As Petersen (2009) 
Institutional Holdings & Repurchases
Since institutions are generally better informed than individual investors, firms with high levels of institutional ownerships should possess lower information asymmetry problems (see Allen, Bernardo, and Welch, 2000) . On the other hand, the answer to how much incremental private information could be extracted from institutional holding is a prior unclear due to their herding behavior (Sias, 2004) . Institutional ownerships could also serve as a monitoring mechanism. In this case, we could expect firms with high institutional ownership to pay higher dividends as they are better-governed firms. 11
Institutional holdings data are collected from Thomson Financial database which provides information from institutional 13F SEC filings. The data are available from 1980. Our measure of institutional holdings is the year-end aggregate institutional stock 10 These are the annual panel data of firm-level R 2 s derived from equation 1 by using the weekly stock return data. 11 Jensen (1986) argues that with enhanced monitoring, firms are more likely to pay out their free cash flow. An alternative argument would be that since these firms have better monitoring mechanisms, they do not have the need to reduce agency costs of free cash flows via dividend payments.
holdings (for each firm) scaled by total value of outstanding shares. We remove all observations that have the ratios above 1. We use lagged holdings to address the concern that institutions are attracted to dividend -paying stocks. On average, institutions (Institutions) hold 35% of total outstanding shares.
From both textbook theory and empirical evidence, shares repurchases are substitutes for dividends, and some authors have shown that repurchases surged in 1980s (Grullon and Michaely (2002)). However, share repurchases, unlike dividends, are temporary and firms repurchasing shares do not need to commit their future operating cash flows to divided payments. For instance, Jagannathan, Stephens, and
Weisbach (2000) suggests that firms with higher institutional holdings are less likely to pay dividends, and among payers, firms with high institutional holdings pay less. 12 From marginal effects (not reported here), shifting from lowest to highest institutional holdings reduces the probability of being a payer by 24%. Shifting the holdings one standard deviation reduces the probability by 6%. It is likely that firms with higher institutional holdings prefer other methods of payments such as stock repurchases (Grinstein and Michaely (2005)). The repurchase dummy is significantly positive for all sample periods: firms that are repurchasing are also dividend payers. Being a repurchaser increases the probability to pay dividends by about 4%. This finding is consistent with that of Fama and French (2001) who show that firms repurchasing are mainly in the domain of dividend payers. Our SPI measure remains significantly positive at the 1% level even after controlling for these additional variables.
We also consider other proxies of agency costs such insider holdings and managerial compensation. However, insider holding and executive compensation data are available only from 1992, and the coverage is not comprehensive even in the years reported. Since we are mainly interested in investigating the disappearing dividend trend by comparing the characteristics in base and forecast periods, adding these data create little value for our purpose. Accordingly, we leave these data for future exercises.
12 Grinstein and Michaely (2005) also have similar findings. The authors find that institutions prefer lowdividend stocks to high-dividend stocks. Between 1978 and 1999 , Fama and French (2001 document a remarkable decline in the fraction of listed firms that pay dividends. Much of this is explained by changing asset characteristics of listeds, but FF show that even after controlling for such differences, the residual propensity to pay dividends has diminished sharply over this period. This dividend disappearance in turn has led to several attempts to explain the puzzle, such as the catering theories of Baker and Wurgler (2004) and the institutional explanations of Amihud and Li (2009) . We do not take issue with these explanations, though we do cast doubt on the main premise in these explanations. Rather, we offer a simple rational explanation based on two concurrent trends over the FF examination period.
Concluding Remarks
The first is a sustained increase in the informativeness of stock prices lessening the relative benefit of costly signaling via dividends. The second trend is the tremendous growth in indexing that has occurred over the last three decades. Under the assumption that indexers care primarily about tracking error, their demand for idiosyncratic information may have also declined. We are not saying that dividends have outlived their usefulness; rather, we point to two concurrent trends that have reduced the marginal benefits of the signaling task entrusted to dividend policy.
Figure 1
Time Series of Market Model R 2 s R 2 s are estimated from market model regressions using monthly data. Equal-weighted R 2 s (solid line) are calculated by averaging over all firms in a given year (excluding financials and utilities). The value-weighted R 2 s (short and long dashes) are derived from equation 1. Short-dashed line plots the 5-year moving averages of value-weighted R 2 s.
Table 1 Comparisons of Announcement Day Abnormal Returns for Different Sample Periods
The announcement day abnormal returns are based on the market, market-adjusted, and Fama and French three-factor models. Dividend initiations are defined as the first appearance on Compustat of an ordinary cash dividend. The 'event period' is defined as days τ = -1 to τ = l, where τ = 0 is the dividend announcement date documented in CRSP. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) are the averages of cumulative returns over 3-day periods. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (1) (1.13%)*** (1.14%)*** (1.09%)*** (3)- (2) (0.88%)*** (0.91%)*** (0.82%)*** (3)- (4) (1.89%)*** (1.95%)*** (1.75%)*** (3)-(5) (2.00%)*** (2.01%)*** (1.91%***)
Table 2 Dividend Initiation Returns and Stock Price Informativeness
Quintile 1 contains years with the highest average R 2 s (lowest SPI), and quintile 5 contains years with the lowest average R 2 s (highest SPI). The announcement day abnormal returns are based on the market, market-adjusted, and Fama and French three-factor models. Dividend initiations are defined as the first appearance on Compustat of an ordinary cash dividend of non-monthly frequency. The 'event period' is defined as days τ = -1 to τ = l, where τ = 0 is the dividend announcement date documented in CRSP. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) are the averages of cumulative returns over the 3-day period. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Market Model
Market-Adjusted FF Model For this measure, sample years are divided into quintiles based on the yearly average R 2 s (reported in Figure 1 ). Quintile 1 contains years with the highest average R 2 s (lowest SPI), and quintile 5 contains years with the lowest average R 2 s (highest SPI). Dividend change announcement returns are based on the market model. Dividend change is defined as the change in dividend from Qt-1 to Qt scaled by dividend at Qt-1. The 'event period' is defined as days τ = -1 to τ = l, where τ = 0 is the dividend announcement date in CRSP. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) are the averages of cumulative returns over 3-day periods. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Dividend yield is defined as the sum of total dividends paid over a 12-month period preceding the announcement month scaled by the average end-of month prices for 3-month period preceding the 12-month period. The announcement day abnormal returns are based on Fama and French three-factor model. The 'event period' is defined as days τ = -1 to τ = l, where τ = 0 is the dividend announcement date documented in CRSP. For CAAR calculation, a firm is considered to be in the index if the dividend announcement date falls within the period when a firm is in the S&P index. The numbers reported are the averages for respective groups. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 5 Effect of SPI on Dividend Increase Announcement Returns
The dependent variable is the 3-day announcement abnormal return (CAR). The announcement day abnormal returns are based on Fama and French three-factor model. The 'event period' is defined as days τ = -1 to τ = l, where τ = 0 is the dividend announcement date documented in CRSP. Independent variables include: R∆DIV, rate of change of dividend, defined as change in dividend from Qt-1 to Qt scaled by dividend at Qt-1; ∆DIV/EPS.VOL, change in dividend scaled by EPS volatility; ∆DIV/P, change in dividend scaled by end-of-month closing price prior to the announcement month; EPS.VOL, EPS volatility; S&P DUMMY, an indicator variable that equals one if the dividend announcement date falls within the period when a firm is in the S&P index, zero otherwise; Size, SIZE, log of total assets scaled by 1962 dollars; Dividend yield, DIVYIELD, sum of total dividends paid over a 12-month period preceding the announcement month scaled by the average end-of month prices for 3-month period preceding the 12-month period. Pooled regression is used. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. I 1971 -2006 II 1971 -2006 III 1971 -2006 IV 1963 -2006 The dependent variables are the changes in propensity to pay (columns I and II) and the propensity to pay (column III). Propensity to pay is the difference between the actual percentage of firms paying dividends in a given year and the expected percentage, which is the average predicted probability from a given logit model that controls for FF and H-P variables. The independent variables include: dividend premium (Premium) and the Nixon dummy. The dividend premium is defined as the lagged value of log of the difference between book-value-weighted average M/B of dividend payers and nonpayers. Premium is lagged once and standardized to have unit variance. The results are based on time-series regression coefficients with Newey-West t-statistics (two lags) in parentheses. ***, **, and * imply the significance of coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. I:1963 -2006 II:1978 -2006 III:1978 -2006 Dependent= Change in PTP Dependent=PTP 
Table 7 The Effect of Stock Price Informativeness on the Propensity to Pay Dividends
The dependent variable is defined as the propensity to pay dividends (both in levels and in changes), which is the difference between the actual percentage of firms paying dividends in a given year and the expected percentage based on a logit model specified in FF and control for FF and H-P variables . The independent variables include: dividend premium (Premium), R 2 measure of SPI (SPI_RSQ). Dividend premium is defined as the lagged value of log of the difference between bookvalue-weighted average M/B of dividend payers and nonpayers. All independent variables are standardized to have unit variances. Premium is lagged once. The results are based on time-series regression coefficients with Newey-West t-statistics (two lags) in parentheses. ***, **, and * imply the significance of coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 8 Panel
Logit Regressions of the Effects of Firm Characteristics on Dividend Pay Status
The dependent variable is a dummy value (DIVPAY) that is equal to one if firm pays dividends, zero otherwise. The independent variables include: firm size (NYP), the percent of firms that have the same or smaller market capitalization; asset growth (dAssets), change in assets scaled by assets; profitability (E/A), income before extraordinary items plus interest expense plus income statement deferred taxes) scaled by total assets s; growth opportunity (M/B), the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets; firmspecific risk (Idiosyncratic), sum of squared residuals from the market model regression using daily data; systematic (Systematic) standard deviation of the predicted values from the idiosyncratic risk regression; SPI.RSQ.W, firm-level R 2 measure of stock price informativeness from weekly data; cash (Cash), the ratio of cash and short-term investments to assets; retained earnings (Retained), the ratio of retained earnings to assets. We remove all financials and utilities. The table reports estimates of panel logit models with standard errors that are robust to clustering at the firm level. Year dummies are included but not reported here. The t-statistics are given in the parentheses: ***, **, and * imply the significance of coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
